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SB08-189 Paper Ballot Bill -- Auditing consideratons.

This is a call for brief phrases to be used in testimony on Monday regarding weaknesses of the bill to require paper ballots to be offerred to all Colorado voters in 2008. In general we are in favor of the overall purpose of the bill and will support it, but in the details there are weaknesses and we must use this opportunity to educate our legislature on the topic of tests and audits and recounts. Much of the original language I had included in the bill is now gone, and the rest is now subject to sunset after 2008 (except two changes, one of which is key which is to the auditing of the actual election tally. This was insertion was partially completed in 2007, and this bill has the remainder of this key and constructive change).

This Monday March 3 is when the "Paper Ballot Bill" will go through the 5 person Senate State Affairs Committee in Colorado. You will be able to listen to testimony at the URL:

http://www.state.co.us/gov_dir/leg_dir/gaweb/scroom356.asx

The meeting happens at 1:30PM Mountain Time Zone on Monday Mar 3.

STATE, VETERANS, & MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
1:30 P.M. SCR 356
SB08-189 by Senator Gordon and McElhany; also Representative May M. and Madden--Paper Ballots
In 2008 Elections

You can read the bill here:

http://www.leg.state.co.us/CLICS/CLICS2008A/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/2F55C45F452F9CA9872573990075D442?Open&file=189_01.pdf

We need testimony to the effect of the following points... even a single line of affirmation for each with a signature and your credentials will help us a lot. Please try to provide these by noon on Monday and I will read them to the committee. Please make up your own version if that makes sense:

1) Small victory margin contests (in our case, < 1/2%) must be recounted by HAND not by machine. Simply reviewing ballots for stray marks and exceptions prior to recounting by machine is not enough to obtain the additional precision which is required by a close election. The 50 ballot logic and accuracy test prior to a same machine recount which is currently required by Colorado rules for a close election recount is grossly insufficient, in fact sadly laughable and serves no purpose other than masking a likely inaccuracy of the election counting process and creating a false sense of accuracy, which in fact is merely repeatability of a possibly inaccurate count.

2) Hand counts for audits and recounts, as well as the taking of original counts by hand can be done accurately, although original counts should be preceeded by a hand LAT (a practice) and followed by an audit, just as machine counts should be.

3) In a close election recount, hand and eye separation of ballots by contest choice prior to machine counting batches of sorted ballots would perform both a hand count and machine count simultaneously. This would allow cross verification of the two methods of counting and expose inaccuracies of either which can then be reconciled in small subsets if batch subtallies are obtained.

4) Precinct reporting is an important component of a high quality auditing framework, and needed to reveal what auditing professionals are calling "facial suspiciousness". A failure to provide for full precinct specific reporting muddies the visibility of election errors and makes accurate and efficient auditing much more difficult.

5) An audit and recount task force which is appointed entirely by the Secretary of State and filled by majority with clerks and Secretary of State staff will not provide the independence needed for a fresh look at auditing. the specifiying of expertise in simple terms like "expert in auditing" and "expert in statistics" and "expert in election management" is grossly inadequate to define the expertise necessary to converge on a superior system. Experts apppointed from outside the current Colorado election authority are needed to create the necessary dialog to reach a better system than we have today.

6) Time frames for response to legislative changes are such that it is essential for election reform agendas affecting certification to be approved in legislature more than one year prior to their enactment. In Colorado legislation in 2008 can be expected to have full effect in 2010, but legislation in 2009 is cutting corners for affecting elections in 2010. The 2008 Colorado legislature should be preparing for the 2010 election.

7) Paper ballots and paper poll books not only provide for verified records of elections, they also are the best tool to prevent lines at the polls. The absence of paper ballots at polls makes line reduction next to impossible, and all depends on the number of expensive voting devices provided at each location. An absence of paper ballots at the polls insures that there will be unequal treatment of voters at different polling places.

8) Transparency of the methods and results of the audit is key to understanding the election and incrementally improving the execution of the audit. For this purpose it is essential to know the source of the election subtally to be audited, the means of hand counting the ballots, the number of ballots cast and counted for all equipment whether or not selected for audit, and the tabulations recorded and steps taken in the process of reconciling the audit.


Any of the above items which you would like to sign on to support or to elaborate on, please do and send to harvie@media.mit.edu asap and prior to a 1:30 PM committee hearing mountain time.